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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATEOFUTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: CaseNo.981688-CA 
vs. 
LYNNL.BELT, 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.5 (1995), in the Second District Court, the 
Honorable Darwin C. Hansen presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court plainly violate defendant's right, under the Utah 
Constitution and Rules of Appellate Procedure, to be present at all stages of trial 
when it correctly answered a note from the jury with defense counsel's express prior 
approval? 
To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) An error 
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 
i 
P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is no plain 
error. Mat 1209. 
2. Does the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution grant a 
criminal defendant the right to be present at all states of trial and, if so, did the trial 
court plainly violate any such right when it correctly answered a note from the jury < 
with defense counsel's express prior approval? 
See standard for issue no. 1. 
3. Did defense counsel perform deficiently or prejudice the trial outcome by 
not objecting to defendant's absence when the court delivered an indisputably 
correct supplemental jury instruction? 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law. See State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App.1998). j 
However, "appellate review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential; 
otherwise the 'distorting effects of hindsight' would produce too great a temptation for 
courts to second-guess trial counsel's performance on the basis of an inanimate record." 
Id. (quoting State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah App.1993) (in turn quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984))). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.5 (1995). 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is guilty 
of a felony of the third degree. 
UTAH CONST. Art. I § 7. 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
UTAH CONST. Art. I § 12. 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel,... 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present 
at the trial with the following exceptions: 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer 
in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court 
may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence 
of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or 
advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall 
be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in 
writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which case 
the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
phasis added.] 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Amended Information with assault by a prisoner, a third 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.5 (1996) (R. 3). Defendant 
was convicted as charged after a jury trial and sentenced to a statutory term (R. 93,107). 
He timely appealed (R. 140-42,144-45). ' 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The crime
 { 
In December of 1997, defendant and Darwin Thompson were housed in the same 
cell in the Davis County Jail (R. 168: 78). One morning Thompson got up, left the cell 
block, and returned with a breakfast tray (R. 168: 80-82). He told defendant, "It's time 
for breakfast. Get up" (R. 168: 81). They argued loudly (R. 169:160-61). 
Another inmate standing at the doorway to their cell saw defendant step back as if i 
Thompson had pushed or swung at him, after which defendant hit Thompson in the face 
(R. 169: 163,171-73). Thompson "just kind of crumbled" (R. 169: 174).
 { 
When a nurse arrived, she found Thompson "lying on his stomach with his right arm 
kind of twisted behind him, the left arm hanging off the side of the bed. He was breathing, 
and there was blood coming out of his nose. There [were] blood splatters around the 
room" (R. 168:109). Blood was on the sink, the toilet, and a nearby mop bucket; blood 
had also been wiped up off the floor (R. 168:109-10). Thompson was "kind of in and out { 
of consciousness" (R. 168: 111). His nose and cheek were crushed (R. 168: 114). 
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The jury's note 
(The record on appeal was supplemented with the following facts on remand to the 
district court for that purpose.) 
Early injury deliberations, the jury foreperson sent a note to the judge asking "What 
was Mr. Belt in Jail fore [sic]?" (R. 92,197). The judge convened an informal conference 
in chambers (R. 198). The prosecutor was present; the judge called defense counsel on 
her cell phone and activated his speaker phone so that everyone heard everything that was 
said (R. 198). Defendant was in a holding cell (id). The judge did not have him brought 
into chambers because he "thought it inappropriate to have the defendant come in without 
counsel being present" (R. 200: 8). 
The judge proposed and dictated a response to the jury that read, "The reason Mr. 
Belt was in jail is irrelevant. Please proceed with your deliberations based on the. 
testimony presented in the courtroom" (R. 92, 198). Both counsel agreed that the 
language and response were appropriate (R. 198). 
The conference was not recorded; the judge determined that a record was 
unnecessary because "the response spoke for itself (R. 195,200: 9). No supplemental 
jury instructions were given because the judge determined that "an instruction would 
unduly belabor an irrelevant point, to the Defendant's detriment" (R. 199). 
5 
1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court did not commit plain error by answering the jury's written 
i 
question correctly and with defense counsel's express approval, despite defendant's 
absence. First, defendant's plain error claim fails where the court acted with defense 
counsel's express agreement. Second, any error could not have been obvious in light of < 
controlling Utah precedent. Third, defendant fails to assert any prejudice, i.e., a 
reasonable likelihood of a different outcome absent the alleged error. 
.TJ*.. . . . i 
2. Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court committed plain error in 
violation of his due process rights by answering the jury's written question correctly and 
with defense counsel's express approval. Again, this claim is waived by defense counsel's 
acquiescence. Moreover, defendant cites no "settled appellate law" holding that a 
defendant is denied his due process rights where defense counsel is present, is consulted,. < 
and approves the action taken by the trial court. Nor does he make any attempt to 
demonstrate how the giving of an indisputably correct supplemental instruction 
i 
undermines confidence in the verdict of his trial. 
3. Defense counsel reasonably did not object to defendant's absence when the court 
gave a correct supplemental instruction. While defendant's presence in chambers might 
have posed risks, it offered no advantages, since he had nothing to contribute to the 
instructional process. Defendant alleges no prejudice, nor is it apparent what prejudice 
he could conceivably have suffered by virtue of the court's proper instruction. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT ALL STAGES OF TRIAL UNDER THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE WHEN IT CORRECTLY ANSWERED A NOTE FROM 
THE JURY WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL'S EXPRESS PRIOR 
APPROVAL 
Defendant claims that the trial court "committed plain error by failing to allow Mr. 
Belt[] to be present at all stages of trial." Br. Aplt. at 17. He asserts violations of the Utah 
Constitution and rule 17, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Br. Aplt. at 16-18. 
A. This claim is waived by defense counsel's acquiescence. 
"Utah appellate courts will decline to consider a plain error argument if defense 
counsel made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or led the trial court into 
error.9' State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,549 (Utah App. 1998) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
Here, the trial court gave a supplemental instruction to the jury that "[t]he reason Mr. 
Belt was in jail is irrelevant" (R. 92). Given an opportunity to respond to this instruction 
before it was sent into the deliberating jury, defense counsel agreed that the language and 
response were appropriate (R. 198). Accordingly, no plain error claim may be predicated 
upon this action of the trial court. 
7 
B. Any violation of article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution was not 
obvious. 
There was no obvious violation of article I, section 12 here, because under < 
controlling case law defendant waived his right to be present. 
To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate three elements: (i) An error 
i 
occurred; (ii) the error was obvious; and (iii) the error was harmful. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). If any one of these elements is missing, there is no plain 
error. Id. at 1209. "Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain 
where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 
236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). 
The Utah Constitution states "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,..." UTAH CONST. Art. I § 12. This 
provision has been applied in the context of the judge communicating to the jury during 
deliberations,. See State v. Lee, 585 P.2d 58, 58 (Utah 1978); see also State v. Neeley, 26 
Utah 2d 334, 489 P.2d 433, 434 (Utah 1971) (not reversible error to give additional 
instruction to jury after it had retired, notwithstanding defendant's absence). 
Lee involved a waiver of the right to be present when the judge communicates to the 
jury. Lee was out on bail and thus "absent from the courtroom, when the trial judge, at 
the request of the jury, told them the time of day when the sun rose on the day of the 
alleged offense." Lee, 585 P.2d at 58. Defense counsel was also apparently absent. Id. 
at 59. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
8 
His counsel correctly contends that constitutionally and statutorily and 
case-wise defendant has a right to be present at all stages of the trial, and a 
duty as well; and that any communication between judge and jury should be 
in the presence of the accused, his counsel and the prosecutor. 
Id. at 58 (footnotes omitted). 
However, Lee's defense counsel learned of this exchange "several hours before the 
jury returned into court, during which time counsel remained silent and raised no question 
as to the propriety of the information, until the verdict was pronounced, and thereafter 
objection was noted for the first time on a motion for new trial." Id. at 59. The court 
found a waiver of the right to be present; a contrary holding, it reasoned, would permit a 
defendant to "gamble with the outcome of a verdict." Id. Lee's conviction was affirmed. 
Id. 
State v. Neeley, 26 Utah 2d 334,489 P.2d 433 (Utah 1971), is also on point. Neeley 
contended that "[i]t was error to give an additional instruction to the jury after it had gone 
to the jury room and in the absence of the defendant." Id. at 335,434. The supreme court 
rejected this claim of error on alternative grounds, including lack of a record on this issue. 
Id. 335-36, 434. It also held, "irrespective of that [absence of a record], with an 
opportunity to have done so, no one objected to the instruction given." Id. at 336,434. 
Consequently, Neeley's conviction was affirmed. Id. at 335,433. 
Here, not only did defense counsel not object to the information given to the jury, 
she expressly approved it (R. 198). Thus, underlie and Neeley, the court committed no 
error, much less obvious error. 
9 
Defendant claims that he cannot have waived his right to be present, since he was 
unaware of the chambers hearing. Without citation to the record, defendant asserts that 
"the record reveals that the trial court failed to provide notice to Mr. Belt of the in-
chambers hearing concerning the communication received from the jury and of the 
discussion of and decision to supplementally charge or respond to the communication of 
thejury."Br.Aplt. at 19. 
The record does not "reveal" these allegations, but is entirely silent on the subject. 
An appellate court's "review is of course limited to the evidence contained in the record 
on appeal." Wilderness Building Systems v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1985). 
Consequently, defendant's claim lacks a necessary factual predicate. 
Nor do the cases upon which defendant relies support his claim of no waiver, as 
none resemble the case at bar. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996), involved 
a defendant sentenced in absentia. The supreme court held that his voluntary absence 
operated as a waiver of his right to be present. A/, at 1111. State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 
987 (Utah App. 1989), involved a defendant who was tried in absentia. This court held 
that by failing to maintain contact with his attorney, Wagstaff had waived his right to be 
present. Id. at 990. 
In the third case, State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677,678 (Utah 1986), the supreme court 
found that a defendant incarcerated out of state did not voluntarily absent himself from his 
Utah trial. The trial court denied defense counsel's request for a continuance to obtain 
10 
defendant's presence, and proceeded to try him in absentia. Id. at 678. This was an abuse 
of discretion. Id. 
These cases are factually dissimilar to the case at bar, which is therefore controlled 
by the factually similar Lee and Neeley. They support the trial court, whose actions were 
thus consistent with, not contrary to, "settled appellate law." Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. It 
therefore committed no error and, even if it did, the error cannot have been obvious. 
C. The trial court acted in compliance with rule 17(a) & (m), Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, as interpreted by Utah case law. 
Defendant's claim that the trial court plainly violated rule 17 fails because the case 
upon which he relies approves the procedure the trial court followed here. Therefore, the 
trial court's decision was obviously correct under rule 17. 
Rule 17(a) and (m), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, states: 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present 
at the trial with the following exceptions: 
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be 
informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer 
in charge of them, who shall communicate such request to the court. The court 
may then direct that the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence 
of the defendant and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or 
advise the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response shall 
be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in 
writing without having the jury brought before the court, in which case 
the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered in the record. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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This issue is controlled by State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1993). Lucero 
was charged with possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault. Id. at 2. After 
trial, the jury was instructed and retired to deliberate. "During deliberation and while 
Lucero and counsel were absent, the jury sent a written question to the judge asking, 4[i]s 
intent against the law?9" Id. Without consulting Lucero or either counsel, the trial judge 
responded in writing, "'[i]t is illegal to possess a deadly weapon with intent to assault. 
Intent without a deadly weapon is not illegal.9" Id. 
Lucero's attorney did not object to the instruction or to the judge's communicating 
with the jury without consulting him. Id. However, after the jury returned a guilty 
verdict, Lucero filed a motion for new trial challenging the supplemental instruction and 
contending "that the judge improperly communicated with the jury during their 
deliberations.99 Id. Specifically, Lucero argued "that it is reversible error for a trial judge, 
to communicate with the jurors after they have retired to deliberate unless the defendant 
and counsel have been notified and given an opportunity to be present." Id. at 3. 
This Court held that, "[p]ursuant to Rule 17(m), the court may respond to an inquiry 
from a jury in writing without having the jury brought before the court. If the judge 
chooses this course, he or she must at some point enter the question and answer into the 
record, giving counsel opportunity to object to the instruction." Id. at 4. Accordingly, this 
court found "the judge's issuance of the supplemental instruction to be proper." Id. . 
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This case is on all fours with the instant case except that here, defense counsel was 
present and approved the supplemental instruction rather than being informed of it after 
the fact. If issuance of a supplemental instruction is proper in the absence of defendant 
and his counsel, it is a fortiori proper in the absence of defendant but in the presence of 
his counsel. No rule 17 error, plain or otherwise, occurred here. 
D. Even if obvious, any error was not prejudicial. 
The plain error doctrine under which defendant proceeds requires the appellant to 
demonstrate that the claimed error "was harmful, i.e., absent the error there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. Defendant does 
not allege that, had he been present when the judge sent the jury a note, anything would 
have been different. See Br. Aplt. at 15-23. Accordingly, this claim fails. 
The action of the court here was eminently correct, as defendant tacitly concedes. 
The court merely sent the jury a note informing them that "[t]he reason Mr. Belt was in 
jail is irrelevant" (R. 92). Defendant never explains, as he is required to do under 
controlling law, why this Court's confidence in the verdict should be undermined by this 
correct supplemental instruction. 
Defendant does not claim that violation of a defendant's right to be present when the 
judge gives an additional instruction to the jury after it has begun deliberations can never 
be harmless, and such a claim would be contrary to Utah law. See Neeley, 26 Utah 2d at 
13 
336,489 P.2d at 434 (rejecting such a claim on the alternative ground that "the instruction 
was not prejudicial to, but actually favorable to the defense"). See also Rushen v. 
Spain, 464 U.S. 114,117 (1983) (per curiam) (stating that "[w]e emphatically disagree" 
that "an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror can never be 
harmless error"). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT PLAINLY VIOLATED FEDERAL DUE PROCESS BY 
ANSWERING THE JURY'S NOTE CORRECTLY AND WITH 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S EXPRESS PRIOR APPROVAL, DESPITE 
DEFENDANT'S ABSENCE 
Defendant claims that "the trial court's improper communication with the jury . . . 
denied Mr. Belt of his constitutional right to due process." Br. Aplt. at 22. 
A. This claim is waived by defense counsel's acquiescence. 
For reasons stated in point LA., above, this claim was waived by defense counsel's 
acquiescence. 
B. Defendant has not shown that the trial court violated settled 
appellate law. 
As noted above, "a trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate 
law to guide the trial court." Ross, 951 P.2d at 239. Defendant cites no case holding that 
a defendant is denied "an opportunity to present evidence and argument," State v. 
Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah App. 1995), where defense counsel is present, is 
consulted, and approves the action taken by the trial court. See Br. Aplt. at 22-23. 
14 
Nor does defendant make any attempt to demonstrate that "absent the error there is 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently,... confidence in the verdict is undermined." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. 
Because defendant has not addressed the fundamental requirements of the plain error 
doctrine, his claim fails. 
POINTIII 
DEFENSE COUNSEL NEITHER PERFORMED DEFICIENTLY NOR 
PREJUDICED THE TRIAL OUTCOME BY NOT OBJECTING TO 
DEFENDANT'S ABSENCE WHEN THE COURT DELIVERED AN 
INDISPUTABLY CORRECT SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by 
not objecting "to Mr. Belt's absence during the in-chambers discussion and decision 
concerning the communication between the judge and jury." Br. Aplt. at 25.* 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must make two 
showings: first, "that his or her counsel rendered a deficient performance that fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable conduct," and second, "that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant." Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 221 (Utah 1993) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). The "[fjailure to prove either one 
1
 The heading to defendant's point II makes reference to "the trial court's failure to 
enter the question and response to the jury's question . . . " Br. Aplt. at 22 (boldface and 
capitalization omitted). However, his argument makes no reference to entering the 
question and response in the record. Accordingly, the State does not address this issue 
except to note that the jury's question and the court's response were entered in the record 
{see R. 92). 
15 
of these prongs will defeat a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Butterfield v. 
Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted). 
To show that trial counsel's performance fell below a reasonable objective standard, 
the "evidence must be sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel rendered 
adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgement." Id. (citation 
omitted). In other words, "[cjounsel must have been of such poor quality that the 
defendant was deprived of the 'counsel' guaranteed by the sixth amendment." Id. 
(citations omitted). However, "[a] mere showing that petitioner did not receive a 
favorable result or that his counsel's strategy did not work as planned does not establish 
that [] counsel was inadequate ... [and appellate courts] do not second guess the tactical 
strategy of trial counsel." Id. (citations omitted). 
"If a rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated, [this Court] will 
assume counsel acted competently." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 
1993). Thus, "an ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable 
legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." Id. 
To show prejudice, "[t]here must be a reasonable probability that but for counsel's 
error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different." Butterfield, 817 P.2d at 
336 (citation omitted). Meeting the prejudice standard is a "substantial task" and "[i]t is 
not enough to claim the alleged errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. 
at 336. Instead, "[t]he error must be such that [the appellate court will] lose confidence 
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in the result on appeal." Id. When "it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on 
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice... that course should be followed." Id. (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 
A. This claim fails because defendant does not establish any deficient 
performance. 
Defendant claims that his counsel performed deficiently "by failing to object to Mr. 
Belt's absence during the in-chambers discussion and decision concerning the 
communication between the judge and jury." Br. Aplt. at 25. 
To perform reasonably, counsel is not required to object to every error, only "readily 
apparent" ones: "the failure of counsel to object to an alleged error that is not readily 
apparent cannot constitute an objectively deficient performance." State v. Hall 946 P.2d 
712, 720 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). Furthermore, "if an 
error was not obvious to the trial court, it most likely was not obvious to trial counsel," 
and consequently "counsel's failure to interpose objections [will] not constitute the 
ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. 
Moreover, by not objecting, defense counsel followed an eminently reasonable 
strategy. Defendant's presence in chambers offered no advantages. As defendant tacitly 
concedes, the trial court gave the only instruction it reasonably could. Therefore, 
defendant's presence for the purpose of consulting on the instruction would have been 
superfluous. Again, defendant tacitly concedes this point; he offers no crucial insight that, 
had he been present, he would have shared with his trial counsel. Obviously, a defense 
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attorney does not perform deficiently by reviewing, objecting to, or approving jury 
instructions without consulting her client. Finally, since the jury was not present, 
defendant's absence signaled no lack of interest in the proceedings. 
On the other hand, there might have been a slight risk in having defendant brought 
into chambers. The judge later commented that it might have been "inappropriate to have 
the defendant come in without counsel being present" (R. 200: 8). Counsel and client 
could not have conveniently conferred, and defendant might inadvertently have spoken 
contrary to his own best interest. 
B. This claims fails because defendant alleges no prejudice and suffered 
none. 
Defendant makes no effort to demonstrate prejudice. He asserts that, by not 
objecting, his counsel denied him of "that to which he was entitled, namely, the 
opportunity to be present in person to defend or object concerning the communication 
with the jury." Br. Aplt. at 25-26. He makes no reference to the requirement that he 
demonstrate the likelihood of a different result and no attempt to show how the court's 
correct instruction to the jury undermines confidence in the verdict. See Br. Aplt. at 24-
25. Indeed, it is unclear what prejudice defendant could conceivably have suffered where 
the trial court properly instructed the jury. Consequently, defendant's ineffectiveness 
claim founders on the prejudice prong also. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Defendant cannot succeed on appeal because (1) the court's actions are supported 
by controlling law, (2) defense counsel acted reasonably, and (3) defendant has failed to 
allege prejudice. Defendant tacitly concedes that the trial court instructed the jury 
correctly. Consequently, oral argument would serve no purpose and a published opinion 
would make no useful addition to the body of Utah law. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted oig9j March 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
OSJR 
istant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed by 
first class mail this^z 1 March 2000 to: 
SCOTT L WIGGINS 
Arnold & Wiggins 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Counsel for Appellant 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
/ c 
Ifc- Mr- BeJh lA/ai in iai( is irre/z,\/atff-. 
.. Mease, proceed m \jOur deliberations WSGP( on 
Jii^e ieshrnonu pn?s<zfjl-ecl <n /he. Cou^rcotn> 
^ ^^7/^^^-• zfcf* 
Addendum B 
David M. Cole #6200 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-4300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
LYNN L. BELT, : Case No. 971701637 
Defendant. : 
The parties came before the Court on the 27th day of August, 
1999, for hearing on the State's request for clarification of the 
record. The Court, having reviewed the file and taken statements 
and argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised, 
hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. During the first stages of the July 17, 1998, jury 
deliberations in the matter of State v. Belt, the foreperson sent 
a note to the Court desiring to know "What was Mr. Belt in jail 
fore (sic)"• 
2. The note was given to bailiff Kevin Brown, who took 
it immediately to the Court. 
3. Deputy Brown did not discuss the note or the case 
with jury members. 
DEC 0 91999 
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4. The Court convened an informal hearing in chambers 
with Melvin C. Wilson, in person, as counsel for the State, Laura 
K. Thompson, via cellular telephone, as counsel for Defendant, 
and Lara-Anne Attaniscio, Judge Hansen's law clerk. 
5. The Defendant was not present during the informal 
hearing in chambers even though he was in a holding cell at the 
time. 
6. The informal hearing in chambers was not recorded 
even though it could have been recorded by magnetic tape. 
7. During the informal hearing in chambers, the Court 
used the speaker phone so that all in chambers could hear each 
others' comments. 
8. Ms. Thompson recalls speaking with the court via 
telephone and agreeing that the Court's proposed response was 
appropriate, but does not recall knowing that Mr. Wilson was 
present in the Court's chambers. 
9. The Court dictated and proposed a response to the 
jury that read, "The reason Mr. Belt was in jail is irrelevant. 
Please proceed with your deliberations based on the testimony 
presented in the courtroom." The Court signed the note, "Darwin 
C. Hansen, District Court Judge." 
10. Counsel for both the state and the Defendant, who 
was not present, agreed that the language and response were 
appropriate. 
11. The note and the Court's response were returned to 
the jury by Deputy Brown, who did not discuss the note or its 
contents with jury members. 
12. No supplemental jury instructions were given. It 
was the Court's judgement that an instruction would unduly 
belabor an irrelevant point, to the Defendant's detriment. 
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